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Abstract 
 
 
Studies of hospital efficiency seldom lead to changes in practice, partly because 
recommendations are unspecific or results are not seen as robust. We describe a 
method to compare hospital costs that utilises patient-level data. We perform a two-
stage analysis in which we first consider factors that explain costs among patients and 
then across hospital departments. We illustrate our approach by examining the costs 
and characteristics of almost one million patients admitted to 136 English obstetrics 
departments in 2005/6. We identify those departments with significantly higher costs 
that need to take action. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In general health care organisations face limited competitive pressures that would 
otherwise encourage them to innovate and adopt cost minimising behaviour. 
Competitive behaviour may be even less in evidence if health care is publicly funded 
or in situations where organisations enjoy a geographical or specialist monopoly of 
supply (Bilodeau et al., 2000). When competitive pressure is weak, there may be 
scope for better utilisation of resources and reductions in cost. But in the absence of 
competition, a regulatory authority or policy maker might be tasked with devising 
incentives that encourage organisations to reduce their costs. These incentives might 
be relatively high-powered, particularly if backed up by financial rewards, or lower-
powered, such as benchmarking or comparative efficiency analyses. 
 
Many countries have introduced some form of prospective funding to pay for hospital 
care, whereby hospitals are paid according to the number and type of patients they 
treat and are unable to influence the price they face (Busse et al., 2006). This creates 
clear financial incentives to reduce costs: hospitals that provide care at a cost below 
the price will make a profit; those providing relatively expensive care will make a 
loss. Such financial arrangements require a means of classifying patients to a limited 
set of payment categories, and most countries use some form of Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs) to achieve this. However the classification system used to 
differentiate between patients can never account for all cost variation, opening up the 
possibility that organisations claim for special treatment because their patients are 
somehow ‘different’ from those in other organisations. Specialist, teaching, or rural 
hospitals or those serving disadvantaged communities, for instance, might argue that, 
for whatever reason, they treat relatively more expensive patients within any payment 
category and in some countries such hospitals have been successful in securing 
additional funds on top of the DRG-based price (Department of Health, 2009, Flook, 
2007, Danske Regioner et al., 2007, Epstein et al., 1990, Duckett, 1998, Brook, 2007). 
The danger is that, unless the basis for these claims can be established, financial 
incentives to encourage cost reducing behaviour will be diluted. At the extreme, with 
every hospital trying to influence the price it faces, prospective funding risks 
degenerating to cost-based reimbursement. By comparing costs across hospitals, the 
regulator can guard against this risk and many commentators have argued that, either 
alongside or instead of financial incentives, comparative performance assessment has 
a role to play in encouraging cost containment (Holmström, 1979, Shleifer, 1985). 
 
This raises the question of how to conduct the comparative analysis and numerous 
studies have examined hospital costs or efficiency using techniques such as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Worthington, 
2004, Hollingsworth, 2008, Rosko and Mutter, 2008). These studies often rely on data 
reported at hospital level, the prime reason being that this is the usual form in which 
data are made available. However these standard means to perform the comparative 
assessment of hospitals present various drawbacks. 
 
The most fundamental limitation is that it cannot be assumed that a common 
production function applies across all hospitals. Indeed the majority of hospitals, 
particularly non-specialist hospitals, house a range of different departments or 
specialties, each of which can be considered as having a distinct production function. 
It is difficult to capture these distinctive features in hospital-level analysis, especially 
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when hospitals are heterogeneous with respect to their specialty mix. Any failure to 
observe and control for this heterogeneity will bias the comparative assessment. 
 
Secondly, analysis restricted to hospital-level data runs into sample size problems in 
many contexts, particularly when considering countries with small populations or if 
comparing particular types of hospital (Olsen and Street, 2008). Although DEA is 
more robust to small sample sizes than SFA, even this technique progressively 
overestimates efficiency the smaller the sample size and the better specified the 
production model (Smith, 1997).  
 
Thirdly, traditional DEA and SFA inefficiency analyses are based on the 
identification of the cost (or production) frontier of a group of organizations. 
Inefficiency is then calculated as the distance between each organizations’ costs and 
the estimated cost possibility frontier. Generally both approaches need strong and 
non-testable assumptions about the model specification (Stone, 2002, Smith and 
Street, 2005), and this risks undermining the comparative exercise. 
 
Fourthly, despite the proliferation of academic research, it has had limited influence 
on regulatory policy and its impact on hospital behaviour has been negligible 
(Hollingsworth and Street, 2006). Hospitals are multi-product organisations and, to 
take action, management needs to know in which part of the hospital the problems 
arise. Studies that consider the hospital as a whole offer limited insight into the source 
of higher costs or apparent inefficiency.  
 
In previous work it has been argued that comparison of hospital departments (or 
specialties) is preferable to comparison of the hospital as a whole (Harper et al., 
2001). This is because each particular department is more likely to be undertaking 
comparable activities, treating similar types of patients and, hence, applying a 
production technology similar to that in the same department in other hospitals 
(Jacobs et al., 2006). Thus comparing the same department across hospitals is more 
appropriate for both analytical purposes and for informing policy-makers and 
practitioners about how to respond to the findings. However, research that focuses on 
departments is uncommon because routine data, particularly on costs, are rarely 
available at this level. In this paper we seek to overcome this drawback by exploiting 
patient-level data, recognising that patients are clustered within departments.  
 
The use of patient-level data offers further important analytical advantages, making it 
possible to exploit information about the characteristics of individual patients 
clustered within each department rather than characteristics aggregated or averaged 
across patients (Rice and Leyland, 1996, Rice and Jones, 1997).  
 
In all probability the primary reason why costs vary across hospital departments is 
because each treats a different mix of patients. Most studies make allowance for 
expected differences in care requirements by differentiating patients using DRGs or 
variants thereof such as the Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) used in England. 
However, as mentioned, patients classified to the same DRG will still have different 
costs. This would not be a problem if this variation were random across hospitals, 
where it is a matter of chance whether any particular patient is more or less expensive 
than the average patient in the DRG to which they are classified. With sufficiently 
large volumes within each hospital, these differences among patients cancel out. 
 4 
Problems arise if the differences across providers are systematic, with one type of 
hospital more likely to treat low-complexity patients and another treating more high-
complexity patients even though they are classified to the same DRG. For example, 
specialist hospitals might attract more severe patients as compared with other 
hospitals because of their reputed excellence in providing such treatments; or 
hospitals located in deprived areas might serve more complex patients because of the 
lower health status of people living in these areas. By using patient-level data when 
making performance comparisons, it is possible to control for various personal and 
diagnostic characteristics over and above the DRG to which the patient is allocated 
(Hvenegaard et al., 2009). 
 
Inferences about the variables of interest will also be more robust if estimation is 
based on individual rather than aggregated data because standard errors will be more 
precisely estimated (Rice and Leyland, 1996). Taking advantage of this, applications 
of multilevel models have become increasingly commonplace. However they have 
been little utilised in analysing the performance of healthcare organisations where it 
has been uncommon to exploit patient-level data. In this paper we exploit patient-level 
data and undertake a two-stage analysis of the variation in costs among patients and 
across departments. We first employ a fixed effects model to examine the 
characteristics of patients that explain their costs over and above the DRG to which 
they are allocated. We are also able to ascertain how much of the variation in patient 
costs is related to the department in which patients are treated, this being captured by 
the departmental fixed effects. These fixed effects may be contaminated by 
heteroscedasticity so, in the second stage of our analysis, we employ an estimated 
dependent variable (EDV) model in order to explore the reasons for departmental-
level variation in costs. This approach avoids the contentious problem of estimating 
an efficiency frontier as necessitated if applying either DEA or SFA (Stone, 2002, 
Smith and Street, 2005). Variation in costs across departments may be due to specific 
‘environmental’ or unavoidable factors that influence costs that which are beyond 
departmental control. We show how to control for these factors and standardise for 
departmental characteristics. This allows us to generate an indicator of the 
comparative costs of each department purged of the influence of patient 
characteristics and unavoidable cost constraints.  
 
We illustrate the technique using data for almost one million patients admitted to all 
136 obstetrics departments in England during 2005/6. We assess three main questions. 
Firstly, to what extent are costs explained by the characteristics of patients admitted to 
these departments? Secondly, after controlling for patient characteristics, why do 
some obstetrics departments have higher costs than others? Thirdly, after controlling 
for patient and departmental characteristics, which departments still have significantly 
higher costs than others? 
 
We provide a brief rationale for our focus on obstetrics care in section two, followed 
by a description of our data in section three. Our econometric approach is described in 
section four followed by results in section five. We draw conclusions in section six. 
 
2 Obstetrics care in the English NHS 
 
The National Health Service (NHS) in England is funded from general taxation and 
free at the point of use. Every NHS patient must register with a general practitioner 
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(GP), and patients require a referral from their GP in order to be admitted to hospital, 
except for emergency and maternity patients. As regards the latter, women usually 
deliver in the hospital where they receive antenatal care, with the GP organising 
antenatal classes and post-natal care. We focus on the hospital component of this care 
pathway, considering the costs of care in obstetrics specialties to illustrate our 
analytical technique.  
 
We chose obstetrics for a number of reasons. First, obstetrics counts for a large 
proportion of NHS activity. Almost 8% of all hospital patients in 2005/6 were 
admitted to the obstetrics department, and the majority of hospitals (86%) provide an 
obstetrics service. 
 
Second, there is large variation in costs across obstetrics departments. This is 
illustrated in figure 1 which shows that the average cost of treating an obstetrics 
patient varies across departments from £500 below the national average to £1000 
above. Also highlighted in figure 1 are two specialist hospitals, Liverpool Women’s 
and Birmingham Women’s, with average costs £200 below and £150 above the 
national average respectively. These hospitals are highlighted to show what impact 
accounting for factors that influence costs might have on conclusions about 
comparative performance. Understanding what factors are responsible of such 
variation in costs is of crucial importance for hospital managers since from 2003/4 all 
hospitals in England have been progressively subject to a form of prospective funding 
known as Payment by Results (PbR) (Department of Health, 2006). Under PbR 
hospitals are paid a fixed price for each type of patient treated, with price based on the 
national average cost (Street and Maynard, 2007). Therefore, departments producing 
services at higher costs than the national average will suffer financial losses. 
 
Third, it is highly unlikely that variations in cost are due to hospitals being selective 
about whom they admit or are due to patients selecting specific hospitals. The first 
possibility is ruled out because English hospitals are prohibited from advertising and 
cannot be selective about who they treat: access is based solely on clinical need 
(Department of Health, 2008a). Selection by patients is also less likely in obstetrics 
than for other specialities, with those requiring maternity care generally preferring to 
be admitted to hospitals close to their home (Propper et al., 2006, Propper et al., 
2007).  
 
Finally, there are analytical advantages to focussing on obstetrics rather than other 
hospital departments. For one thing, there is a limited set of HRGs to which obstetrics 
patients are allocated: the majority (96%) of activity is confined to twelve HRGs 
(chapter N, comprising neonatal, maternity and antenatal care). Table 1 shows the 
distribution of activity in obstetrics departments according to HRGs in the N chapter, 
together with summaries of cost. Compared to specialties that treat a more diverse set 
of patients, this should ensure limited heterogeneity in the production process across 
obstetrics departments.  
 
The analytical task is also simplified because most patients (98%) admitted to 
obstetrics remain under the care of a single consultant during their hospital stay. In 
contrast, this is the case for about 79% of all patients admitted to hospital in England 
(Castelli et al., 2008). The implication is that, more so than in other hospital 
specialties, activity in obstetrics departments is reasonably self-contained. This helps 
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ensure that the costs of care are borne solely and fully by the obstetrics department, 
rather than reflecting joint production with other specialties. 
 
 
2 Data 
 
We analyse the hospital episode statistics (HES) for all patients discharged from an 
English obstetrics department in 2005/6. HES comprise individual patient records – 
defined as a Finished Consultant Episode (FCE) – about every NHS patient admitted 
to hospital in England. Each patient record contains socio-demographic (e.g. age, 
gender, income deprivation in their area of residence) and clinical information (e.g. 
diagnoses, procedures performed). 
 
From an initial population of 1,009,747 obstetrics patients the final sample used in our 
analysis is reduced to 951,277 after dropping patients for the reasons detailed in 
Appendix 1. Our main analysis considers all patients admitted to obstetrics, while a 
supplementary analysis focuses only on those admitted for maternity care, these being 
patients allocated to HRGs N06-N11. The latter analysis allows us to assess whether 
conclusions about costs across departments are sensitive to what activity is 
considered.i  
 
Each patient record in HES is mapped to cost information supplied by every English 
hospital. All hospitals are required to apply a standard top-down costing methodology 
to produce costs for each elective day case, elective inpatient, and non-elective 
(including maternity) HRG in each of their departments (Department of Health, 
2008b). This means that total hospital costs are progressively cascaded down first to 
treatment services (wards, theatres, pharmacy, etc), then to specialties, and finally to 
HRGs. These costs are calculated on a full absorption basis, meaning that they should 
reflect the full cost of the service delivered. We map these costs to each patient 
according to hospital and department in which they were treated, their admission type, 
the HRG to which they were allocated, and their length of stay, by applying the 
process detailed in Appendix 2.  
 
For obstetrics departments, variation in patient level cost is illustrated in Figure 1, 
where each vertical set of points shows the cost of all patients in each obstetrics 
department. Variation is also evident when considering the costs only for those 
admitted for a delivery, as shown in figure 2.  
 
The most common explanation that hospitals offer for their higher costs is that they 
treat different types of patients to their counterparts. We consider various patient 
characteristics that might explain variation in costs. We construct a set of dummy 
variables specifying the HRG to which the patient is allocated (see Table 1), with the 
HRG for a normal delivery (N07) being the reference category.ii We also consider the 
patient’s age, the income deprivation of the area where the patient lives and a set of 
variables specific to obstetrics care, namely the number of babies delivered, birth 
weight, and whether or not the baby was still-born. Finally we construct a set of 
diagnostic and procedural variables, including counts of diagnoses and operations 
performed and dummy variables which capture the most frequently recorded 
diagnostic characteristics that might explain costs over and above the HRG to which 
the patient is allocated. Table 2 reports the ICD-10 codes used to construct these 
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variables and the number of obstetrics and maternity patients to which they apply. 
Descriptive details of the explanatory variables for all obstetrics patients and the 
maternity sub-sample are shown in table 3. 
 
Part of the variation in costs across obstetrics departments may be due to the 
characteristics of the departments themselves. Descriptive statistics of department 
variables we consider are provided in Table 4. We consider the number of patients 
treated as a measure of departmental size, and assess whether larger departments have 
lower costs. Costs may also be driven by the size and composition of the staffing 
complement, which we capture as an index of the number of whole time equivalent 
obstetricians, gynaecologists and midwives per 100 patients. This index weighs staff 
of different types according to their respective wages.iii  
 
We examine the impact of insurance contributions per birth on variation in 
departmental costs. These contributions are a significant proportion of costs incurred 
in obstetrics departments, with each department’s contribution based on staffing 
levels, number of births, claims history and risk management strategies.iv We also 
consider variables describing the hospital in which the department is located, 
including whether it has a teaching function, a neonatology department operating as a 
distinct unit apart from the obstetric department, and how many sites the obstetrics 
department is split over, if any. We also take into account the quality of clinical 
coding by measuring what proportion of the hospital’s total caseload lacks sufficient 
coded data to be apportioned to any HRG (Healthcare Commission, 2007).  
 
Arguably all these departmental variables are within the control of the department, if 
only in the short run. Hospitals have (at least some) discretion about their scale of 
operation, their staffing complements, and the hospital’s configuration. They are also 
able to influence their insurance contributions to some extent by improving their risk 
management strategies and can improve their coding of HES data. While these 
variables might explain variation in costs, they do not represent unavoidable 
constraints on their ability to control costs, at least not in the long term. Consequently 
it would not be legitimate to control for these factors in a performance analysis 
(Giuffrida and Gravelle, 2001, Smith and Street, 2005).  
 
However, English hospitals do face unavoidable constraints that impact on their 
production costs and that are outside their control. These constraints are recognised by 
the English Department of Health which makes top-up payments to hospitals in more 
expensive parts of the country to take account of the differential prices of labour and 
capital inputs over which these hospitals have little control (Mason et al., 2009). 
These top-up payments are based on the so-called the Market Forces Factor (MFF) 
index which captures geographical variation in the cost of labour, buildings and land 
across England. We use this input price index to control for these unavoidable 
constraints when comparing costs across obstetrics departments.  
 
 
4 Methods 
 
Our objective is to analyse the variation in costs across departments after taking 
account of differences in the patients they treat and unavoidable factors that might 
affect departmental costs but that are beyond their control. To do this, we perform a 
 8 
two stage analysis. First we regress patient costs against a set of patient characteristics 
that might explain their costs. From this equation we obtain each department’s 
average cost purged of the influence of the characteristics of their patients. Second we 
investigate variations in these average costs across departments using an Estimated 
Dependent Variable (EDV) model. 
 
In the first stage we estimate a fixed effects model of the following formv: 
    
ij h ij j ijc u v  β h       (1) 
 
Where ijc is the cost for patient i  in department j  and  ijh  is a vector of the variables 
capturing the HRG to which the patient is allocated and the other patient 
characteristics summarised in Table 3.  
 
From equation (1) we obtain ˆ ju , the departmental fixed effect, which can be 
interpreted as a measure of relative departmental performance after allowing for 
differences in patient characteristics (Hauck et al., 2003, Bhalotra and Zamora, 2008). 
Positive values indicate that the average cost of patients in the department in question 
is above the national average.  
 
Note that these fixed effects are not equivalent to the efficiency estimates derived 
from applying cross-sectional stochastic frontier models. A second-stage analysis of 
efficiency estimates is inappropriate because SFA models rely on estimation of an 
efficiency frontier in relation to which each organisation’s efficiency is measured. 
This means that efficiency estimates are not independent observations, thereby 
invalidating the standard assumptions for regression analysis (Simar and Wilson, 
2004). Instead, we avoid estimating a frontier and exploit the multilevel structure of 
our data to extract independently distributed departmental fixed effects. 
 
Factors driving residual variation in costs across departments, as captured by these 
fixed effects, can be explored. To this end, the departmental fixed effects estimated in 
the first stage are regressed against a set of departmental variables in a second stage 
regression of the form: 
 
0 1ˆ j j x j ju z     δ x     (2) 
 
Where jz  captures unavoidable differences in input prices faced by providers in 
different parts of England as measured by the input price index and jx is a vector of 
variables capturing departmental characteristics, summarised in Table 4.  
 
In order to provide a picture of the obstetrics departments’ relative performance, we 
examine the variation in their average costs after controlling for unavoidable 
differences in input prices and standardising for the departmental variables included in 
jx . This is achieved by indirect standardization: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
j
is z
j ju u u          (3) 
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0 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
j
z
j x ju z    δ x       (4) 
 
Where ˆ ju is obtained from equation (1) and jxx is the vector of departmental 
characteristics in equation (2) set to their mean. Standardization is performed in order 
to avoid omitted variable problems that might arise if the input price index, jz , is 
correlated with jx  (O'Donnell et al., 2008). Finally, 1ˆ  and ˆ xδ are parameters 
estimated from equation (2). 
 
We interpret ˆ
j
isu  as a measure of relative departmental performance in controlling 
costs, purged of the effect of the characteristics of their patients and the input prices 
they face. 
 
The two stage model described here is based on two main assumptions about the data 
generating process (DGP) that determines the observed cost, patient characteristics, 
and department characteristics in obstetrics departments. First, we assume separability 
between patient characteristics and input prices in the cost function of the obstetrics 
departments. This allows us to purge their influence from the departmental average 
cost. This is similar to the assumption made by Simar and Wilson in the solution they 
propose to the problem of non-independence of efficiency estimates from SFA and 
DEA models (Simar and Wilson, 2004).  
 
Second, we assume that the obstetrics departments share the same cost function. This 
allows us to describe how departmental level variables influence department costs in 
the second stage and is required in order to identify what factors are responsible for 
the variation in average costs across departments. This is a fairly strong assumption 
for analysis at hospital level given the multiproduct nature of hospital activity. But we 
argue that the activity of hospital departments, such as obstetrics, is more 
homogeneous and, consequently, can be realistically considered as subject to the same 
underling production process. 
 
The two-stage model we have specified borrows from the literature on EDV models 
that are widely applied in political analysis studies. Jusko and Shively and Lewis and 
Linzer discuss extensively the hypothesis under which EDV models involving a two 
stage approach are consistent and efficient (Jusko and Shively, 2005, Lewis and 
Linzer, 2005). In particular, heteroscedastic sampling errors in the estimated 
dependent variables might result in biased standard errors in the second stage analysis. 
Efron robust SE estimators are adopted, which are known to provide a suitable 
solution under this hypothesis.vi  
 
Note also that the potential gains in efficiency from estimating a two-stage model in a 
single stage are modest when considerable information is available at the bottom level 
(Lewis and Linzer, 2005). In our study we have almost one million observations at 
patient level, with each department having no less than one thousand observations. 
This makes our two-stage procedure a valid analytical approach. 
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5 Results 
 
5.1 Patient-level costs 
 
Estimation results for the patient-level equations are presented in Table 5. Results for 
the full sample of obstetrics patients appear first. The first set of variables show the 
estimated cost for each HRG relative to the cost of a normal delivery (i.e. N07 HRG), 
after conditioning on the other covariates. Most of the neonatal HRGs (i.e. N03-N05) 
are less expensive than the reference HRG, N07, hence their negative values. The 
main reason is that neonatal care, particularly for more complex cases, is managed in 
dedicated neonatology departments in most hospitals. Thus, most of the neonatal care 
supplied in the obstetric departments is probably for relatively less complex cases. For 
maternity HRGs (N06, N08-N11) the estimates are little different to the mean costs 
(compared to N07) reported in Table 1.  
 
The estimates show that costs are driven by patient characteristics over and above 
their HRG classification. The income deprivation of the area where the patient lives is 
associated with higher costs, a finding in line with evidence about the relationship 
between socioeconomic deprivation of the patient treated and the cost of treatment 
(Cookson and Laudicella, 2009). As would be expected, costs are higher the more 
babies each woman delivers, the more diagnoses recorded and the more procedures 
performed. As for the diagnostic markers, in particular pre-eclampsia/eclampsia and 
infections explain an economically relevant portion of the average cost of patients 
treated in obstetrics and diabetics also have higher costs. Conversely some patient 
conditions are associated with lower costs, the most economically relevant being the 
occurrence of abortion.  
 
The second set of estimates in table 5 presents results when considering maternity 
patients only (i.e., patients assigned to HRGs N06-N11). Results are broadly similar 
to those for all obstetrics patients, unsurprisingly given that maternity patients 
comprise 47% of the total. But there are some notable differences. The baby’s weight 
and mother’s smoking behaviour are associated with lower costs. The former is an 
indicator of the baby’s and mother’s health, while the latter reflects the circumstance 
that mothers in better health are less likely to quit smoking during pregnancy, as 
shown in the economic literature (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983). Finally, it is 
notable that the occurrence of an infection is by far the most relevant determinant of 
high costs in maternity care, patients suffering infections costing £300 more to care 
for than those who do not. Table 3 shows that 2% of maternity patients are at risk of 
infections. Particularly if contracted after admission, investment in efforts to reduce 
the risk of infection might generate substantial cost savings.  
 
While patient characteristics explain much of the variation on costs, they do not 
explain it all. After taking all these characteristics into account, there remains a high 
degree of unexplained variation in the average cost per patient across departments, as 
indicated by the value of rho in Table 5. When considering all obstetrics patients, 
19% of the variation in costs occurs at department level rather than being due to 
observed characteristics of the patients within departments. For maternity patients 
there is a higher proportion of variance in costs among departments (rho=28%). We 
explore what drives this departmental variation in our second stage analysis. 
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5.2 Comparison of departmental performance 
 
In our second stage analysis, we consider what influence departmental characteristics 
have over variance in ˆ ju . The fixed effects from estimating equation (1) for all 
obstetrics patients are highly correlated with those from maternity sample (r=0.87). 
 
Table 6 reports results from the model in equation (2) for all obstetrics and for just 
maternity patients. There is some evidence of lower costs in obstetrics departments 
with higher volumes of activity, although this effect is not statistically significant 
when considering the maternity sample. Costs are also lower in the obstetrics 
department if the hospital has a separate neonatology unit, perhaps indicating better 
organisation of services. Finally, higher average costs are evident in departments that 
face higher input prices, although the effect is not significant in the maternity sample. 
Insurance contributions are not significant in explaining variations in costs among 
departments. This is not surprising given that the burden of these premiums is similar 
across all departments as reported in the descriptive statistics in Table 2. Nor are any 
of the other variables are found to be significant predictors of the variation in 
departmental costs. 
 
After controlling for differences among departments in the type of patients they treat 
and in the input prices they face by applying equation (3), we order departments 
according to their average costs and report the 95% confidence intervals around their 
mean in Figure 4. Note that the shape of this distribution is little different from that 
shown in Figure 1, where departments were ordered simply on the basis of their 
unadjusted costs. Even after standardising for patient characteristics and differential 
input prices there are significant differences in average costs across obstetrics 
departments. At the extremes, departments have standardised costs more than £500 
above or below the national average.  
 
The impact of allowing for patient characteristics and input prices varies from 
department to department. This is evident for the two specialist hospitals, both of 
which rise up the ordering when allowance is made for these things in considering 
their costs of provision. Figure 5 shows the extent to which each department changes 
its average costs once patient characteristics and input prices have been taken into 
account. Each department is ordered on the basis of its standardised average cost from 
the least to most expensive, with the vertical line indicating its unadjusted cost. It is 
notable that even though expensive departments have relatively more complex 
patients or face higher input prices, their costs are still higher than in other 
departments once these differences have been accounted for. Thus, the position of 
departments with higher costs remains unchanged and any claims that these 
departments treat relatively more complex patients or face higher unavoidable costs 
can be discounted. 
 
Finally we consider what impact focussing solely on maternity provision has on the 
ranking of obstetrics departments according to their standardised costs. Figure 6 ranks 
departments from the least to most expensive in the provision of obstetrics care after 
adjusting for patient case-mix and input prices. The vertical line extending from each 
departmental position on the obstetrics rank shows their ranking if maternity care 
services only are considered.. For some departments the re-ranking is quite 
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substantial. However, for the most and least expensive obstetrics departments it makes 
no difference whether analysis is based on all obstetrics patients or just on the 
maternity sub-sample. Therefore there are a handful of obstetrics departments with 
significantly higher costs that cannot be explained by the types of patients they treat 
or the input prices they face. These departments are those where the regulator or 
hospital management should have greatest concerns about their efficiency. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
By using patient-level data our analysis offers several contributions over other 
approaches to consideration of hospital costs or efficiency. The first advantage is that 
the researcher is not restricted to consideration of the hospital as the unit of analysis 
but can undertake departmental-level analysis. One of the main analytical problems 
with analysing hospitals is that each comprises a diverse range of specialties and any 
failure to account for the heterogeneous mixture of production functions within and 
across hospitals will undermine the comparative exercise. We argue that departments 
can be considered more homogeneous and, therefore, more comparable than hospitals 
and can be assumed to be subject to a common production function. 
 
Second, we provide more insight into why costs vary from one patient to another, 
since we are able to account for a much broader range of patient characteristics than 
simply the HRG (or DRG) to which the patient is allocated. As expected, the patient’s 
HRG captures much of difference in the cost of treating different patients in 
obstetrics. However, we found that some diagnostic markers also contribute in 
explaining differences in costs over and above the HRG classification. Most striking 
here is that patients suffering an infection have substantially higher costs. These costs 
might be avoided if the risk of infection could be reduced.   
 
Variation in costs over and above HRG classification may be indicative of some 
inadequacies with the HRG classification system, which has been revised since the 
time to which the data in this study refer. The new version 4 HRGs may be more 
successful at capturing variation in costs because the number of HRGs has been 
expanded considerably, from 665 to around 1400 HRGs overall. The number of 
maternity HRGs in version 4 has expanded from six to nine and an age split (at 18 
years) has been introduced. 
 
Third, the multilevel structure of patient-level data enables us to obtain a departmental 
fixed effect without resorting to stochastic frontier methods. Thus, we are not forced 
to make assumptions about the production or cost frontier and are able to investigate 
variations in our fixed effects in a second-stage analysis – a process that would be 
suspect if analysing variation in non-independently distributed efficiency estimates 
(Wang and Schmidt, 2002, Simar and Wilson, 2004). Our comparative analysis of 
departments’ costs is purged of the influence of heterogeneity in the characteristics of 
their patients and of the influence of differential prices paid for their inputs. After 
taking account of the effect of patient characteristics and input prices, substantial 
variation in the average cost per patient persists across departments. Higher average 
costs are evident in smaller obstetrics departments, departments in hospitals that lack 
a separate neonatology department and where differential input factor prices are 
higher.  
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Although we have controlled for an extensive set of patient characteristics and 
differences in input prices in our analysis, there may be further explanations as to why 
costs vary across departments that our analysis has been unable to account for. One 
possibility is that hospitals differ in their coding practice, to the extent that some 
provide better coded HES data than others. Our variable measuring coding quality 
was not significant however. Another possibility is that hospitals assess their costs in 
different ways, with differences likely to stem from how they have decided to 
apportion shared resources, such as doctors working across specialties, or hospital 
overheads, even though the Department of Health give detailed guidelines on 
common accountancy practice to be adopted. While this apportionment is problematic 
whatever costing system is in place (Jackson, 2001), it may have less impact in 
obstetrics departments, these being relatively self-contained, than for specialties that 
are more inter-linked with others. A further reason why costs might differ, of course, 
is that some obstetrics are simply better organised and more efficient than others. We 
have identified those obstetrics departments that have significantly higher costs than 
others and that need to take action to avoid financial losses under a prospective 
funding regime. 
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Table 1 Activity in obstetrics departments, by HRG 
HRG  
Patients 
% of all 
obstetrics 
patients 
Cost 
Mean Cost SD 
N01 Neonates - Died <2 days old 252 0.0% 
         
716  
         
329  
N02 
Neonates with Multiple Minor 
Diagnoses 972 0.1% 
         
1,091  
         
201  
N03 
Neonates with one Minor 
Diagnosis 6,236 0.7% 
         
763  
         
176  
N04 
Neonates with Multiple Major 
Diagnoses 30 0.0% 
         
830  
         
1,082  
N05 
Neonates with one Major 
Diagnosis 184 0.0% 
         
777  
         
713  
N06 Normal Delivery w cc 20,847 2.2% 
         
1,831  
         
765  
N07 Normal Delivery w/o cc 251,360 26.4% 
         
1,126  
         
526  
N08 Assisted Delivery w cc 5,916 0.6% 
         
2,240  
         
907  
N09 Assisted Delivery w/o cc 50,597 5.3% 
         
1,483  
         
463  
N10 Caesarean Section w cc 19,072 2.0% 
         
3,366  
         
1,310  
N11 Caesarean Section w/o cc 97,547 10.2% 
         
2,350  
         
834  
N12 
Antenatal Admissions not  
Related to Delivery Event 464,972 48.8% 
         
647  
         
461  
Total N  917,985 96.4% 
         
1,100  
         
854  
Other All other HRGs 34,292 3.6% 
         
771  
 
Total  952,277 100.0% 
         
1,079  
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Table 2 Obstetrics patients with particular diagnostic markers 
Label ICD-10 diagnosis codes 
All obstetrics 
patients Maternity patients 
Pre-eclampsia and eclampsia O14.0-O15.9      14,335  1.51%      9,124  2.05% 
Haemorrhage O2O.8 O20.9 O44.1 O46 O67 O72 O03-6.1&6      74,946  7.88%     42,220  9.51% 
Diabetes O24 R81 E1      17,995  1.89%      9,395  2.12% 
Infection O23 O44.1 O75.3 O86 R50 J22.X O03-6.0&5      27,258  2.87%      8,709  1.96% 
Hypertension O16 O11 I10      28,089  2.95%      8,551  1.93% 
Obesity E66        2,002  0.21%         947  0.21% 
Smoker Z72.0      19,597  2.06%     14,142  3.18% 
Lifestyle risk factors Z72.1 Z72.2 Z72.4&8&9 Z35.7 Z86.4 Z91.5 Z86.5        9,568  1.01%      6,406  1.44% 
Abortion O01 O02 O03 O04 O05 O06 O07 O08        7,408  0.78%         407  0.09% 
Allergy Z88      15,041  1.58%     10,150  2.29% 
Past history of disease Z85 Z86.0&1&2&3&6&7 Z87.4        8,556  0.90%      5,777  1.30% 
Complications in past pregnancy Z87.5 Z87.6        2,785  0.29%      1,804  0.41% 
Perineal laceration O70.2 O70.3      93,873  9.87%     93,386  21.03% 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of patients 
 
 
  
All obstetrics patients All maternity patients 
  mean Std_dev mean Std_dev 
Cost 1088 849 1578 915 
Age 28.09 6.92 28.82 6.42 
Income deprivation index 0.177 0.134 0.170 0.132 
Number of babies 0.405 0.509 0.840 0.416 
Birth weight (1000g) 1.174 1.630 2.432 1.562 
Delivered dead 0.002 0.043 0.004 0.060 
Number of operations 1.120 1.429 2.348 1.212 
Number of diagnoses 2.294 1.432 3.165 1.411 
Pre/eclampsia 0.015 0.122 0.021 0.142 
Haemorrhage 0.079 0.270 0.096 0.294 
Diabetes 0.019 0.136 0.021 0.144 
Infection 0.029 0.167 0.019 0.138 
Hypertension 0.030 0.169 0.019 0.137 
Obesity 0.002 0.046 0.002 0.046 
Smoker 0.021 0.142 0.032 0.175 
Lifestyle risk factors 0.010 0.100 0.014 0.119 
Abortion 0.008 0.088 0.001 0.030 
Allergy 0.016 0.125 0.023 0.149 
Past disease 0.009 0.094 0.013 0.113 
Complications in past pregnancy 0.003 0.054 0.004 0.064 
Perineal laceration 0.099 0.298 0.210 0.407 
Observations 
      
952,273    
  
445,339    
 
 
 
Table 4 Departmental descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std_dev 
Number of patients (100s) 70.02 41.03 
Insurance per birth (£) 545.15 17.08 
Staff  99.64 48.39 
Teaching status 0.15 0.36 
Neonatology dept 0.51 0.50 
Total sites 1.15 0.50 
Coding quality 1.18 1.97 
Input price index (x100) 112.40 8.60 
   
Departments 136  
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Table 5 First stage estimates  
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Results of second stage estimates  
  
All obstetrics patients All maternity patients 
  coeff Se t coeff se t 
Number of patients (100s) -1.58 0.66 -2.39 -1.75 1.17 -1.50 
Insurance per birth (£) 0.83 1.32 0.63 1.81 2.01 0.90 
Staff  0.72 0.44 1.64 1.31 0.88 1.48 
Teaching status -65.54 53.77 -1.22 -5.69 97.65 -0.06 
Neonatology dept -111.23 42.71 -2.60 -160.57 64.70 -2.48 
Total sites 50.64 46.88 1.08 37.60 53.63 0.70 
Coding quality -3.50 9.95 -0.35 -1.68 16.58 -0.10 
Input price index (x100) 7.03 2.71 2.59 5.49 4.57 1.20 
Constant -1153.94 815.46 -1.42 -1564.25 1304.47 -1.20 
           
R-sq 0.19    0.11    
Departments 136     136     
coeff se t coeff se t
N01 Neonates - Died <2 days old -279.19 107.21 -2.60
N02 Neonates with Multiple Minor Diagnoses 237.34 116.17 2.04
N03 Neonates with one Minor Diagnosis -184.02 100.08 -1.84
N04 Neonates with Multiple Major Diagnoses -186.20 419.53 -0.44
N05 Neonates with one Major Diagnosis -215.25 219.76 -0.98
N06 Normal Delivery w cc 681.00 72.74 9.36 636.67 64.38 9.89
N08 Assisted Delivery w cc 1023.30 59.96 17.07 990.87 51.82 19.12
N09 Assisted Delivery w/o cc 308.75 19.09 16.18 316.33 18.91 16.73
N10 Caesarean Section w cc 2119.47 74.40 28.49 2070.30 75.21 27.53
N11 Caesarean Section w/o cc 1192.64 52.35 22.78 1191.64 52.11 22.87
N12 Antenatal Admissions -303.82 38.92 -7.81
F47 General Abdominal Disorders <70 w/o cc -170.30 72.90 -2.34
S33 Examination, Follow up and Special Screening -338.14 58.46 -5.78
M05 Upper Genital Tract Minor Procedures 87.37 112.01 0.78
M11 Medical Termination of Pregnancy -56.83 42.94 -1.32
M14 Treatment of Fibroids, Menstrual Disorders, or Endometriosis -253.08 49.81 -5.08
All other HRGs -1.75 59.06 -0.03
Age -1.31 1.24 -1.05 -3.43 1.66 -2.06
Age 2^ 0.04 0.02 1.93 0.08 0.03 2.66
Income deprivation index 36.18 8.56 4.23 33.47 10.51 3.19
Number of babies 72.98 36.35 2.01 119.90 20.88 5.74
Birth weight -14.37 12.56 -1.14 -53.76 5.29 -10.17
Delivered dead -26.71 52.67 -0.51 -55.07 36.06 -1.53
Number of operations 34.87 7.72 4.52 19.07 3.92 4.87
Number of diagnoses 24.69 5.57 4.43 22.61 3.20 7.07
Pre/eclampsia 299.40 20.94 14.30 359.27 26.60 13.50
Haemorrhage 21.25 12.88 1.65 51.25 15.06 3.40
Diabetes 51.40 14.45 3.56 75.98 13.08 5.81
Infection 185.45 16.59 11.18 303.26 27.67 10.96
Hypertension 17.24 13.97 1.23 40.66 26.58 1.53
Obesity -56.16 29.90 -1.88 7.83 36.27 0.22
Smoker 15.62 24.12 0.65 -38.71 10.12 -3.82
Lifestyle risk factors -16.86 25.78 -0.65 21.06 11.79 1.79
Abortion -160.11 36.25 -4.42 64.45 38.04 1.69
Allergy -51.23 14.02 -3.65 -33.41 6.67 -5.01
Past disease -15.46 12.80 -1.21 -4.55 8.37 -0.54
Complications in past pregnancy -62.98 33.37 -1.89 -37.10 22.05 -1.68
Perineal laceration -41.06 8.39 -4.89 -30.64 5.64 -5.43
Constant 917.46 36.50 25.13 1077.45 31.23 34.50
Sigma_u 250.31 362.03
Sigma_e 524.21 573.82
Rho 0.1857 0.2847
R-sq within 0.5675 0.5444
R-sq between 0.5161 0.0558
R-sq overall 0.5514 0.4739
Patients 952,273 445,339
Departments 136 136
All maternity patientsAll obstetrics patients
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Figure 1: Average cost of obstetrics care, by department 
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Figure 2: Patient costs by obstetrics department, all obstetrics patients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Patient costs by obstetrics department, maternity patients only 
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Figure 4 Standardised average costs of obstetrics care and 95% confidence intervals, 
by department  
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Figure 5 Comparison of standardised and unadjusted average costs, by department  
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Figure 6 Departmental rank based on standardised average costs for all obstetrics 
patients compared to rank from analysis of maternity only. 
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Appendix 1: Starting and analytical samples 
 
From a starting sample of 1,009,747 patients admitted to obstetrics departments 
during 2005/6, a number of records were dropped from the analysis for the following 
reasons.  We omit eight hospitals where fewer than 1,000 patients are recorded in the 
obstetrics department.vii 1,125 patients are dropped because of this.  Two hospitals did not use the obstetrics specialty code when making their cost 
returns, making it impossible to match their HES and cost data. Three other 
hospitals failed to report costs for a high proportion of the HRGs to which 
their patients were allocated. These five hospitals are excluded, meaning that 
30,895 patients are dropped from the analysis.viii   For 13,063 patients, there was no corresponding reference cost reported by the 
patient’s hospital for the HRG to which they were allocated, meaning that a 
cost could not be assigned to them. These losses were not at random being 
concentrated among a selective set of hospitals.ix   Patients assigned to “U” HRG codes are dropped, of which there were 12,014.  A small number of obstetrics patients are recorded as having invalid or very 
long lengths of stay. Some of these values may be due to errors in recording 
either the date of admission or date of discharge, although some may be 
genuine values. Conservatively we have decided to drop 133 patients with a 
length of stay of more 100 days.   Finally, we exclude 260 observations with a cost in excess of £15,000. 
 
Table A1 Starting and analytical samples   
 observations % 
Starting sample 1,009,747 100.00% 
Drop activity in low volume NHS hospitals 1,125 0.1% 
Drop hospitals that did not assign obstetrics specialty code in 
their Reference Cost return or that had low volumes after 
matching 30,875 3.1% 
Drop activity where that could not be matched to Reference 
Cost data 13,063 1.3% 
Drop activity assigned to U code HRGs 12,014 1.2% 
Drop FCEs with LoS more than 100 days 133 0.0% 
Drop FCEs with cost more than £25,000 260 0.0% 
Sample for analysis 951,277 94.3% 
 
 
Appendix 2: Assigning reference costs to individual HES records 
 
In making their cost returns to the English Department of Health hospitals report five 
pieces of cost information for each HRG (h) in each of their specialties. So, for any 
given obstetrics department, j, the following will be reported:  Average cost per day case in HRG h: dhjc   Average cost for elective patients in HRG h with a length of stay below HRG-
specific trimpoint value: ehjc   Excess per diem cost for an elective patient in HRG h who stays in hospital 
beyond the HRG-specific trimpoint: ehjex  
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 Average cost for non-elective (including maternity, baby or a transfer) patients 
in HRG h with a length of stay below HRG-specific trimpoint value: nhjc   Excess per diem cost for a non-elective patient in HRG h who stays in hospital 
beyond the HRG-specific trimpoint nhjex  
 
Trimpoints are defined for length of stay outliers in each HRG according to whether 
the patient was admitted as an elective or non-elective. We define eht  as the elective 
trimpoint in days and nht as the nonelective trimpoint for HRG h.
x
 
 
The costs provided by each hospital are assigned to each patient record in HES, 
according to the type of admission and how long each patient stays in hospital, as 
follows:  
  If the patient was treated as a day case d dihj hjif a c    If the patient was an elective with length of stay at or below the elective 
trimpoint ( , )e e eihj ihj h hjif a L t c    If the patient was an elective with length of stay above the elective trimpoint 
( , ) ( )e e e e eihj ihj h hj hj ihj hif a L t c ex L t         If the patient was non-elective with length of stay at or below the non-elective 
trimpoint ( , )n nihj ihj h hjif a L t c    If the patient was a non-elective with length of stay above the non-elective 
trimpoint ( , ) ( )e n n n nihj ihj h hj hj ihj hif a L t c ex L t        
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 In further analyses we also sub-divide patients on the basis of their length of stay, details being 
available here http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/che/pdf/rp49.pdf 
ii
 Rather than dummy variables, it is common to construct a casemix index to capture cost variation 
across HRGs. Construction requires attaching a resource weight to each HRG to allow aggregation. In 
this study, the relatively small number of HRGs and large sample size allow us to avoid making 
assumptions about HRG relative weights and, instead, we estimate weights from the data. 
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v
 Although there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in patient costs, transforming costs into logarithmic 
form is not required to our analysis. OLS provides consistent estimates of departmental fixed effects 
which are the main objective of our analysis in the first stage. Using log transformation may improve 
the estimation of the SE, but will result in estimated coefficients based on geometric rather than 
arithmetic mean. Retransforming such coefficients is not straightforward in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (Manning 1987). We obtain consistent SE by applying the cluster robust estimator. 
vi
 While the Breush-Pagan test for test for heteroshedasticity is negative in the second stage model 
(equation 2) this is known to be not completely reliable in small samples (Long and Ervin, 2005). 
Therefore, we apply Efron standard errors. 
vii
 RC1 Bedford Hospital NHS Trust (18 FCEs), RD1 Royal United Hospital Bath NHS Trust (50), 
RDZ The Royal Bournemouth And Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (9), RG3 Bromley 
Hospitals NHS Trust (97), RLN City Hospitals Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust (547), RN7 Dartford 
And Gravesham NHS Trust (124), RNH Newham University Hospital NHS Trust (277), RXW 
Shrewsbury And Telford Hospital NHS Trust (3) 
viii
 RG2 Queen Elizabeth Hospital NHS Trust (11,676 FCEs), RJ1 Guy's And St Thomas' NHS 
Foundation Trust (5,354), RAJ Southend University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (10,590). RBZ 
Northern Devon Healthcare NHS Trust (1,297), RNJ Barts And The London NHS Trust (1,998). 
ix
 Some departments have a minimal number of obstetrics patients assigned to a diverse range of HRGs. 
Examples are RGQ Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust (where 1,214 FCEs are allocated to 27 HRGs for 
which costs are not reported); RQM Chelsea And Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (849 
FCEs, 63 HRGs). 
x
 Trimpoints are revised periodically by the Information Centre. We have applied the trimpoints that 
were published alongside the national tariff for 2005/6 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4
091529 accessed 15/9/08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
